Introduction
There is a consensus that Venture Capital plays a catalytic role in promoting innovation (Kortum & Lerner, 2000) , in contributing for economic growth and in fostering labour force capabilities by opening career opportunities to high-qualified individuals (Smith & Estibals, 2011; Christofidis & Debande, 2001; Andersson & Napier, 2007; Bascha & Walz, 2002) . Christofidis & Debande (2001) pointed out that capital markets are typically geared to provide funding for large, well-known companies due to the costs and information disclosure procedures that go along the use of this source of funding. On the other hand, banks are likely to be unwilling to lend to new technology and/or commercial ventures that are perceived to bear an unacceptable high risk due to the combination of high degree of innovation and the absence of a proven track record.
Therefore, Venture Capital fills this financing gap by providing funds to these high-risk, potentially high-rewarding projects by purchasing equity stakes while firms are still held privately.
Given the important role played by Venture Capital in providing financing resources to new technology based firms and smaller initiatives linking R&D to commercial firms, it is crucial to investigate what are the determinants for the optimal design of financing contracts established between Venture Capital firms and their portfolio of firms. Schmidt (2003) suggests that the predominance of convertible securities on Venture capital backed investments is due to the existence of double-sided moral hazard problems. Repullo & Suarez (2004) define the doubled-sided moral hazard as the financing problem that arises when the efforts that both venture capitalist and entrepreneur have to commit for the expansion of the project are unobservable at the start-up stage. Repullo & Suarez (2004) and Schmidt (2003) contend that convertible securities provide a powerful incentive mechanism that can induce both entrepreneur and venture capitalist to commit effort at the start-up stage and to invest efficiently at the expansion stage. Indeed, the incentive mechanism embedded in the conversion option ensures that the venture capitalist will invest at the expansion-stage if he/she exercises his/her conversion rights and this only happens if both venture capitalist and the entrepreneur put in the efficient amount of effort at the start-up stage.
Therefore, as authors such as Schmidt (2003) , Repullo & Suarez, (2004) , Kaplan & Gompers (1997) , Gompers (1997) , Hellmann (1998) point out, convertible securities in venture capital financing strictly outperform any standard debt-equity contract.
On the other hand, extensive literature (e.g. Gompers, 1995; Gompers, 1997; Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Baker & Gompers, 2003; Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1995; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Smith, 2005; Schwienbaher, 2008) argues that the inclusion of explicit control right covenants in venture capital agreements allow for reduction of excessive conflicts of interest between venture capitalist and entrepreneur. More importantly, these authors contend that the mitigation of the conflicts of interests between venture capitalist and the entrepreneur cannot rely solely of the use of a particular financing instrument. Specifically, Gompers (1997) emphasises that, although many theories of financial instruments have focused on optimal control allocation, the use of cash-flow rights -such as convertible preferred stocks or convertible debt -to resolve control rights allocation is deemed not to be optimal in the venture capital context. According to authors like Gompers (1997 ), Hellmann (1998 and Kaplan & Strömberg (2003) , while convertible securities should be used to assure an optimal allocation of cash-flow rights, control rights covenants are better suited to solve conflicts of interest related to corporate control. In particular, a number of authors argue that the inclusion of contractual covenants in venture capital financing is particularly important to resolve disagreements regarding optimal exit strategies (Cumming, 2008; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Smith, 2005; Bienz, 2010; Schwienbacher, 2008) .
As pointed out by Gompers (1997) , venture capital projects -characterised by extreme uncertainty, severe asymmetry of information and potentially high rewards -provide a unique perspective to assess the role of financing contracting and corporate control. Nevertheless, existing empirical studies tend to focus on the role played by individual rather than multiple contractual features in resolving issues regarding the allocation of cash-flow rights or corporate control rights. In this regard, this paper is novel in a number of ways. First, it provides a comprehensive empirical investigation of costeffective contractual mechanisms (such as convertible securities and control rights covenants) that are expected to reduce the double-sided incentives in venture capital investments. Second, to our best knowledge, it is the first study that uses an innovative methodology -the fuzzy set Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) -to assess the effect of convertible securities and control right covenants in mitigating double-sided incentive problems arising from venture capital-backed investments. The fsQCA is a particularly well-suited methodology for this study because it considers not only the impact of individual factors (as in the traditional regression analysis) but most importantly it takes into account the effect of combinations of factors that shape the design of venture capital contracts. Moreover, fsQCA considers both qualitative and quantitative sources of data in order to convey a more insightful account of the issues that influence the design of cost-effective contracts. To this extend, in order to run our model we use both quantitative data -generated by the questionnaire survey -and qualitative data that is rooted on a comprehensive review of the extant literature on venture capital financing. Finally, this study focuses on a sample of venture capital firms operating in the Portuguese market which, albeit an expanding market, has not been well investigated by the existing empirical literature.
Our results reveal that convertible securities are more likely to be used when the severity of doublesided incentive problems is particularly stringent. This result provide strong support to the agency cost theory proposed by Schmidt (2003) , Kaplan & Gompers (1997) , Gompers (1997 ), Hellmann (1998 , among others. On the other hand, only a weak support is found for the use of control rights covenants to reduce double-sided incentive costs. Interestingly, although not consistent with broad agency predictions, this evidence corroborates theoretical predictions that deviate from the traditional corporate finance view. Indeed, a recent stream of literature suggests that, in the particular context of Venture Capital settings, the use of control rights covenants is required not necessarily to decrease principal-agent conflicts of interest, but rather to increase value-creation opportunities (e.g. Manigart, et al., 2002; Wright & Robbie, 1998) or to reduce idiosyncratic risks associated to non-diversified venture capital portfolios (e.g. Wright & Robbie, 1998; Yoshikawa, Phan, & Linton, 2004) . Therefore, our paper provides a significant contribution to ongoing research regarding the different role played by financing instruments (namely, convertible bonds and convertible preferred shares) and by the use of control rights covenants in the specific context of Venture Capital.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview of theoretical predictions and empirical evidence regarding the use of convertible securities and control rights covenants in Venture Capital contracts. Section 3 outlines the methodology, sample and data used in this study. Section 4 presents the results and discusses their implications. Finally, section 5 presents the conclusions of this study and suggests future research paths.
Literature review
Venture Capital firms are considered to have a positive effect on the backed firms' productivity (Croce, Martí, & Murtinu, 2013) and growth (Davila, Foster, & Gupta, 2003) , to be able to enhance the backed firms' operational and financial performance (Alperovych & Hübner, 2013; Gompers & Lerner, 2004) and to promote the backed firms' innovation (Gompers & Lerner, 2004; Kortum & Lerner, 2000) . Additionally, authors such as Park, LiPuma, & Prange (2015) and Lockett, Wright, Burrows, & Paton (2008) point out that Venture Capital firms contribute for enhancing the internationalisation prospects of venture capital-backed projects.
In the same context, Gorman & Sahlman (1989) According to Schmidt (2003) the predominance of convertible securities on investments backed by Venture Capital can be explained by the existence of a double-sided moral hazard problem. Doublesided moral hazard occurs when actions from the agent (entrepreneur) cannot be observed by the principal (venture capitalist) or verified by third parties (e.g. courts). To this extent, Schmidt (2003) points out that the success of high-potential entrepreneurial firms depends not only on the quality of the project and the effort exerted by the entrepreneur but also on the commitment of the venture capitalist to actively manage the projects they finance 1 . Therefore, there should be a mechanism to 1 Some of the efforts committed by the entrepreneur can be described as his/her endeavours to build up the company, to engage in R&D and develop the product, to set up the production facilities and to market the product. On the other hand, the venture capitalist commits effort by advising on strategic decisions, helping to find key employees and to design suitable compensation packages for them, contacting key suppliers and induce both venture capitalist and entrepreneur to undertake effort and therefore curb the doublesided moral hazard issues. Convertible securities act as such mechanism because on one hand, the venture capitalist will invest and exercise his conversion rights only if the entrepreneur commits sufficient effort to the project and on the other hand, the entrepreneur will commit sufficient effort only if the investor is actively involved not only on the financing but also on the management of the enterprise. According to Schmidt (2003) , the latter explains why convertible instruments are very popular among venture capital financing and uncommon when the funding of small firms is made by banks or other passive investors. Bascha & Walz (2002) show that, for the German venture capital market, convertible securities (namely, convertible debt and convertible preferred shares) are used when the severity of agency problems is particularly high. Furthermore, their results are in line with theoretical predictions (Schmidt, 2003; Gompers, 1997; Hellmann, 1998 ) that convertible securities, unlike traditional mix of equity-debt financing, allow the optimal allocation of cash flow rights. Other strand of the literature (e.g. Marx, 1998; Berglof, 1994; Schwienbacher, 2008; Cumming, 2008; Arcot, 2014) emphasises that convertible securities allow for a reduction of conflicts between investors and entrepreneurs because it leads to a more efficient allocation of control rights, namely, the right to decide on exit strategy. Indeed, these authors argue that because entrepreneurs derive private benefits from staying independent and remaining in control of their company after exit, they prefer exit through IPOs even when trade sale or write-off are more efficient strategies for the venture capitalist. Convertible options that are exercisable at different re-financing stages of the project would allow the allocation of control rights to the right persons. However, Gompers (1997 ), Hellmann (1998 , Schmidt (2003) , Kaplan & Strömberg (2003) , Cumming (2005) among others, emphasise that convertible securities play a distinctive role from control rights covenants because they permit the decustomers and even by getting involved in day-to-day operations of the company (Schmidt, 2003; Hellmann & Manju, 2002) .
coupling of the payoff from the control problem and allow double-sided monetary incentives to be dealt separately from control incentives. To this extent, this strand of literature suggests that conflict of interests between Venture capitalist with claims over residual equity rights and the entrepreneur who controls the value of those rights (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003; Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996; Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994) can be mitigated by the inclusion of additional control rights covenants. In an extensive review of current Venture Capital literature, Yoshikawa, Phan & Linton (2004) point out that, Venture capitalists protect their claims over residual equity rights by closely monitoring the management of the venture firm through the use of such mechanisms as investment staging (Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Gompers, 1995) , active monitoring in the boardroom (Lerner, 1995; Gompers, 1997; Baker & Gompers, 2003) , operational control (Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Gompers, 1997; Baker & Gompers, 2003) and even shareholders agreements that allow the venture capitalist to replace the entrepreneur with outside managers (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1997; Baker & Gompers, 2003 show that the inclusion of specific contractual rights protect venture capitalist claims over exit decisions. We can therefore assume that these control rights mechanisms will dilute the entrepreneur incentives to incur in excessive risks and will align his/her interests with the interests of the venture capitalist. This in turn will lead to a desirable reduction in agency costs.
In line with existing literature we consider five potential causal conditions that might lead to the exacerbation of moral hazard problems. These are: the age and size of the Venture Capital firm (Bascha & Walz, 2002; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Norton & Tenenbaum, 1993) , the ownership structure of the Venture Capital firm (i.e. whether is privately or publicly held) (Bascha & Walz, 2002) , life stage of Venture Capital investment portfolio (Gompers, 1995 (Gompers, , 1997 Bascha & Walz, 2002) and the venture capitalist's expected rate of return (Bascha & Walz, 2002; Gompers, 1995 , 1997 , Gupta & Sapienza, 1992 Manigart et al., 2002) . According to these authors, younger and smaller VC firms, that are privately held and that invest primarily in seed and start up projects for which high returns are expected, are more likely to be exposed to excessive agency problems.
Specifically, Bascha & Walz (2002) , Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) and Norton & Tenenbaum (1993) argue that less experienced and smaller VC firms will face more asymmetries of information regarding the entrepreneur ability to pursue a successful venture which will exacerbate agency issues.
On the other hand, Bascha and Walz (2002) stress that privately owned, unlike public VC firms, tend to invest in riskier activities for which higher returns are expected. Moreover, the uncertainty regarding the success of the venture capital investment tends to be exacerbated for early stage projects (i.e. seed and start up projects) (Gompers, 1995 (Gompers, , 1997 Bascha & Walz, 2002 ) and for investments with particularly high expected returns (Bascha & Walz, 2002; Gompers, 1995 , 1997 , Gupta & Sapienza, 1992 Manigart et al., 2002) . The increase of investment uncertainty is likely to increase the conflicting incentives between the investor and the entrepreneur. Against this background, we test the hypothesis that smaller and younger VC that are privately held and that invest in early stage projects for which higher rates of return are expected are more likely to include convertible securities to finance their portfolio in order to curb agency problems. In line with the arguments by Gompers (1995) , Gompers (1997) , Gompers & Lerner (2001 ), Cumming (2008 , Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) and Smith (2005) , among others, we also test the hypothesis that firms with these characteristics are more likely to include additional covenants in their shareholders' agreements in order to allow the optimal allocation of control rights.
Methodology
In this study we use an innovative methodology -the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Fuzzy set QCA) -that considers the impact of both quantitative and qualitative factors on the occurrence of the outcome. Moreover, as pointed out by Ragin (2000) QCA incorporates the concept of equifinality in which alternative causal conditions can produce the same outcome. Schneider & Wagemann (2012) also refer to the concept of conjunctural causation, stressing that QCA takes into account that the occurrence of the outcome is more often than not dependent on combinations of causal conditions rather than on the effects of single conditions acting in isolation of one another.
Considering the exploratory perspective of this study and its focus on investigating possible combinations of determinants for the choice of cost-effective contractual mechanisms in Venture
Capital investments, this methodology is deemed most suitable for obtaining robust results. We apply this methodology to a sample of Venture Capital companies from Portugal. These companies were selected from SABI (Iberian Balance sheet Analysis System) database according to their activity code. A survey was conducted during the first half of August 2016 and from an initial database of 29 companies, two companies were excluded, as they were no longer active. From the remaining 27 companies, we have collected responses from 15 companies, which corresponds to a response rate of 55.55%. The survey was comprised of a questionnaire sent to the CEO or to a fund manager of these companies. The questions were designed in order to obtain information regarding the prevalence of convertible securities (namely, convertible preferred shares and convertible bonds) in Venture Capital backed investments and of control rights mechanisms (namely, refinancing options, exit options and additional restrictive covenants) that allow venture capitalists to closely manage their portfolio of firms. Furthermore, additional questions were included to obtain information about the characteristics of Venture Capital firms (i.e. size, age, and ownership structure) and their portfolio of firms (predominance of seed and start-ups projects and of high return claims), which are considered in the literature as able to exacerbate moral hazard problems. The questions aiming to assess the importance of convertible securities and control right covenants in Venture Capital contracts and the predominance of seed and start up investments on the Venture Capital portfolio were set on a 7-point Likert scale spanning from 1: not important to 7: very important. Appendix I shows the survey questionnaire used in this study.
Apart from ownership structure (that we consider as a binary variable), we calibrate our remaining four causal conditions and two alternative outcomes into fuzzy sets. A fuzzy set can be seen as a continuous variable that is purposely calibrated to indicate the degree of membership in a welldefined and specified set (Ragin, 2008) . We adopt the indirect method of calibration that allows us to group the initial data from the questionnaire into six-value fuzzy scale. Thus, we are able to consider the quantitative variation evident in the raw data from the questionnaire avoiding the restriction to three qualitative anchors i.e. 1 for full membership, 0 for full non-membership and 0.5 for maximum ambiguity point -which characterises the direct method of calibration (Rawlance, 2010) . For Venture Capital firms' age and size, we attribute a score of 0 for firms with less than one year and with less than five Venture Capital projects in their portfolio (respectively) and a score of 1 for firms with more than ten years and more than one hundred Venture Capital projects in their portfolio (respectively). According to Ragin (2008) indirect method should be used when it is not possible to precisely specify key benchmarks but only provide a broad classification of cases. Ideally, calibration thresholds should be set based on extant theoretical knowledge. However, as the literature related to Venture Capital does not provide guidance on what theoretically should be the thresholds for the different degrees of membership, we use percentile ranges similar to ones used in previous studies that rely on fuzzy set methods (e.g. Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2015; Jordon, 2012) . To calibrate the two outcome sets, the convertible securities and the inclusion of control rights, first we relied on Boolean algebra to combine the several sets of contractual mechanisms such as convertible options and exit/refinancing options and other control rights (e.g. participation in the day-to-day management of VC-backed firms and inclusion of tag/drag along rights 2 ) into these two outcome sets. According to Ragin (2008) two or more fuzzy sets can be compounded through the logical and (intersection of sets) or joined together through the logical or (union of sets). Specifically, if the final set is deemed to represent the intersection of two or more fuzzy sets, the score attributed to this set is the minimum membership 2 Tag along provision grants the Venture Capitalist the right (but not the obligation) to have his shares bought on the same terms (including price) as the entrepreneur. Drag along provision grants the Venture Capitalist the right to force the entrepreneur to sell his shares on the same terms as the VC if the latter decides to sell his shares (British Private Equity & Venture Capital Association, 2007) .
score of each case in the sets that are combined together. On the other hand, if the joined set represents the union of two or more component sets, the score attributed to the former set is the maximum membership score of each case in the component sets (Ragin, 2008) . In this study, we consider the use of convertible options on Venture Capital financing contracts as the union between the predominance of convertible bonds and the predominance of convertible preferred shares sets.
Additionally, we consider the set, inclusion of control rights covenants in Venture Capital shareholder's agreements, as the intersection between inclusion of exit and refinancing options combined with the inclusion of more restrictive covenants such as drag/tag along options or covenants that allow the Venture Capitalist to participate in the day-to-day management Venture Capital-backed investment. As with project's life-cycle condition, initial Likert scale data is transformed into percentiles and the qualitative fuzzy set codes are allocated accordingly. Table 1 shows how the fuzzy codes for these sets are allocated. After calibrating the sets of causal conditions and the outcome, the fsQCA procedure involves three main steps (Ragin, 2000; Ragin, 2006) . The first step is the construction of a truth table. The rows in the true table list display all the possible combinations of causal conditions. As it was explained above, this study uses 5 causal conditions. Therefore, there are a total of 2 5 =32 possible combinations on the true table list for both outcomes (Ragin, 2006) . The second step is to set a frequency threshold so that around 80% of the sample in the analysis is considered in the final result (Greckhamer, Misangyi, & Fiss, 2013) . Ragin (2008) suggests that for small sample studies the frequency threshold should be set at a minimum of 1 in order to keep all the empirically observable combinations to maximise diversity and coverage. To this extent, in the fuzzy set estimation we kept all the combinations that had at least 1 observable case. The third step is to define a consistency cut-off point. Ragin (2000 Ragin ( , 2006 defines consistency as the degree to which cases exhibiting a causal or combinations of causal conditions agree with (or are included in) the outcome set. Although the minimum value for consistency cut-off recommended by Ragin (2006) combinations of causal conditions. In order to obtain results that reflect our data as closely as possible, avoiding therefore the reliance on relatively subjective assumptions, the findings reported are restricted to the complex solution from the fsQCA 2.0 software. As pointed out by Schneider & Wagemann (2012) the complex solution is the more adequate solution when there is no a priori "theory-guided hunches" about the effects of causal conditions on the occurrence of the outcome. Table 2 This reveals the empirical relevance of these configurations in determining the outcome. Moreover, the overall consistency value of 95% shows that these configurations are indeed in agreement with the set outcome (Ragin, 2006) . On the other hand, all configurations have unique coverage well over zero (0.06 to 0.17) which according to Schneider & Wagemann (2012) make them deemed for interpretation. Capitalist on this investment project. Therefore, as suggested in the literature (e.g. Gompers, 1997; Bascha & Walz, 2002; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003; Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996; Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994) , it seems that convertible securities, by allowing the decoupling of payoff from control mechanisms, play a different role from covenants in curbing doublesided incentives from venture capitalists and related portfolio of firms. Interestingly, although the evidence contradicts the use of control rights for highly uncertain, early-stage projects for which Venture capitalists demand higher required returns, it suggests that private, smaller and more experienced firms are more likely to resource to control rights that allow them to more closely manage their financed-backed projects. Thus, although not supporting double-sided incentives theory, this result seems to be in line with Yoshikawa, Phan, & Linton (2004) and Wright & Robbie (1998) evidence that smaller venture capital portfolios with more specialized investments (namely, by technology and by industry) require a more direct and active monitoring from the venture capitalist.
Results
Moreover, this result is also consistent with value-creation theory that argues that post-investment direct monitoring by the Venture Capitalist creates value namely by helping to identify additional business opportunities (Manigart, et al., 2002; Bhidé, 2000) or by providing the enterprise with more effective managerial skills (Wright & Robbie, 1998) . Thus, this result points to new paths for further empirical research on venture capital market. Indeed, future empirical research should examine whether the use of control rights covenants by private, more experienced venture capital firms with less-diversified portfolios is primarily due to the need to reduce idiosyncratic risk arisen from investment specialization and/or due to the desire to increase value-creation opportunities. This would provide a significant contribution to the analysis of the different roles played by convertible options and by control rights covenants on the design of optimal financing contracts in the Venture Capital setting. 
Conclusion
In this study we examine the use of convertible securities and control rights covenants in Venture
Capital contracts when double-sided moral hazard problems are particularly stringent. We focus on a stream of literature (e.g. Schmidt, 2003 , Bascha & Walz 2002 Gompers, 1995; Gompers, 1997; Bergemann & Hege, 1998; Baker & Gompers, 2003; Sahlman, 1990; Lerner, 1995; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989 ) that argues that both convertible securities and control rights covenants can be used to mitigate excessive agency costs. A number of authors such as Gompers (1997) , Hellmann (1998) and Kaplan & Strömberg (2003) (Manigart, et al., 2002; Wright & Robbie, 1998) or to reduce idiosyncratic risks (Yoshikawa, Phan, & Linton, 2004 and Robbie, 1998) . We therefore suggest that future empirical research on Venture Capital should address the different roles that financial instruments and control rights mechanisms play on the design of optimal contracts. Indicates presence of the causal condition in the occurrence of the outcome Indicates absence (i.e. negation) of the causal condition in the occurrence of the outcome Indicates that the causal condition is not required for the occurrence of the outcome 
